What the Red Sea ship attacks are really about

 

 

 

What the Red Sea ship attacks are really about

 

 

After the Israel-Hamas war broke out on October 7, 2023, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, began attacking ships passing through the Red Sea. The Houthis pledged to attack any ship in these waters that does business with Israel, to protest Israel's war on Gaza and to show solidarity with Palestinians there. But as the attacks have continued, another motive for them has become apparent: strengthening the Houthis' control of Yemen. 

After a nine-year civil war, the Houthis today control a sizable area in Yemen, with over 70 per cent of the Yemeni population within the group's territory. The conflict has devastated the country, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. More than 377,000 Yemenis have been killed — by airstrikes from a Saudi-led coalition, landmines and detonations planted by the Houthis, a lack of medical services, and scarcity of food and water due to a naval blockade. Both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis have been accused of committing war crimes against Yemenis.

Today, the Houthis are attempting to establish themselves as Yemen's legitimate leaders in the eyes of Yemenis, though they've done little to improve the country's humanitarian crisis. The Red Sea attacks, which appear to have significant support among the Yemeni people, might be a means to achieve that goal.

 

 


1)
This is the MY RUBYMAR, a British-owned cargo ship which was hit by a missile on February 18, 2024 and sank in the Red Sea. 

The rocket came from Yemen, from a group known as the Houthis. It was one of dozens of attacks they've carried out on ships in the area since November 2023.

The Houthis control much of Yemen, which has been in civil war for more than nine years. The war has caused one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with more than 350,000 people killed by either side of the violence.

2)
The Houthis say they're attacking ships in the Red Sea that are doing business with Israel in protest against Israel's war in Gaza and in solidarity with the Palestinians and to put pressure on those involved in the war. 

Still, there's another story behind the Houthis attacking these ships: who controls Yemen? 

For centuries, the most populated area of Yemen has been ruled mainly by religious ZAYDIS, a Shia Muslim sect; in the 1960s, a military revolution occurred.

3)
The first leaders of North Yemen were either deposed or assassinated, but in the late 1970s, a colonel who had participated in the revolution, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became its president. 

However, he wasn't politically aligned with the ZAYDIS cause and often marginalised them. 

In 1990, Saleh unified the country with South Yemen. As the new government formed, a Yemeni politician, Hussein Al-Houthi, started the ZAYDIS movement in Sada province, where many of Yemen's ZAYDIS were.


4)
Most of the country was Sunni nominated Al-Houthi, and his followers strongly criticised Salah. They were against Sunni Saudi Arabia's rising religious and financial influence in the region. 

There was a tiny militia, not more than a few thousand soldiers, started from an ideological belief that they had to rule Yemen, and as Salah cooperated with the US in its war on terror, they became more militarised and hostile to him. 

5)
In 2004, Salah's forces tried to arrest Alui, sparking clashes between them later that year. Salah's army killed Al-Houthi, but this only made his movement more robust, and the new leadership and its followers became known as the Houthis. 

6)
Over the next few years, the Houthis continued to clash with the government, and some reports say that around this time, they also began to cooperate with Iran, a Shia-majority country. 

Then, in January 2011, protests began to spread across the Arab world, struggling against repression, poverty and corruption.

7)
Salah eventually resigned and was replaced by a Saudi-backed transitional government led by interim President Abd-Rabbu Mansor Hadi, who began a national dialogue to form Yemen's new government. 

The Houthis initially participated in the dialogue, but after disagreeing with the new system of government. 

8)
They felt marginalised from their influence, so they left in 2014. Later that year, amid a new wave of protests over fuel prices, Hadi's national dialogue collapsed. 

9)
The Houthis saw an opportunity for the president's residents to come under attack, followed by the nearby presidential palace, and the Houthishade took control of some parts of the capital. 

We demand to get rid of this corrupt government; the Houthis allied with their former enemy, Salah, to expand their rule, deepen their control in Yemen and understand how the system works.

10)
But also to play the system, and in September 2014, they took control of the capital, Sonaa; because of the transition, Yemen had no army to defend itself, so this walked intermediation they are in today. 

They extended their control to HODEIDAH, a key port city that gave them access to the Red Sea. 

11)
Hadi fled further south as the Houthis followed and eventually fled to Saudi Arabia in March 2015, leaving Yemen without a legitimate government and bringing Saudi Arabia into a civil war. 

A Saudi coalition led a bombing campaign against Houthi-controlled areas. Eventually, it imposed a naval blockade around Yemen aimed at restricting the flow of weapons from Iran to the Houthis.

 

 

 

12)
But the Houthis could still hold on to the territory they had taken over. Through this chaos, they were able to expand. The Houthis are expansionist by nature. 

The more Saudi Arabia intervened, the more chaos there was in Yemen, and the more they would see or present themselves as the legitimate actors and the defenders of sovereignty against the foreign invasion in the new territories that they controlled.

13)
Many non-ZAYDIS and non-followers of the Houthi rule that brutal Saudi intervention in Yemen created a devastating humanitarian crisis. 

And the Houthis have also created a humanitarian crisis with their governance system, which is absent terrorising the local population. Human rights organisations accuse both the Saudi-led coalition. 

14)
The Houthis of war crimes such as air strikes, landmine attacks and forced disappearances of opponents. Women have also been detained, and women, in particular, women who have any advocacy against the Houthis. 

15)
So, their governance is more brutal in that respect. This was similar to the Taliban in 2017 amid tensions between Salah and the Houthis over who would wield power. 

The Houthis killed him by 2020 after hundreds of thousands of deaths; the Saudi Le Coalition started to pull back on air strikes and some of the blockade unbroker ceasefire talks.

16)
The talks between the Houthis and the Saudis started in April 2022. They began with the fighting in Hajj, but the most recent agreement in December 2023 aimed to ease the restrictions on the SANNA airport and the port of Hajj and open up Yemen more economically. 

17)
However, there was little mention of accountability for the harm done to Yemenis, and it was still unclear how Yemen would be governed and man. 

Many felt that any kind of agreement between the Saudis and the Houthis would be somewhat counterproductive because it's all about Saudi security rather than Yemeni security. 

18)
That was a concern for many Yemenis who were not on the side of the hut and did not want to see them have absolute control in the country. As this video shows, the Huthis control territory that contains over 70% of the Yemeni population. 

At the same time, they lack international recognition or legitimacy, and apart from their supporters inside Yemen, they also lack legitimacy among a Yemeni population ravaged by years of crisis, which the Houthis are trying to achieve is to, you know, legitimise themselves.

19)
They want to broaden their support by framing their actions in the context of supporting Palestine; their operations should appeal to Arab and broader Muslim sentiment. 

So the more they focus on Palestine, on the conflict with Israel, on the humanitarian crisis there, the more it distracts from the local issues of the Yemeni conflict. 

20)
From the governance failures they're experiencing, the Red Sea attacks have caused significant disruption to international trade. Now, a US-UK coalition is targeting Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

21)
Yemen in retaliation, making the situation even worse for Yemenis, but there are signs that the Houthi strategy may be working across Yemen in massive protests and support for the Palestinians. 

22)
Yemenis are also showing support for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and even for Houthi leaders, which suggests that even if the Red Sea attacks aren't evidence that the Houthis are doing anything to improve the disaster in Yemen, they may be a way for the Houthis to strengthen their hold on power.

 

 

 

 

What the Red Sea ship attacks are really about

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPhTwmylZi8

 

 

 

Add info No1)

What the Red Sea ship attacks are really about
Houthis say they are reavenging Gaza. But there's a lot more to it.

https://www.vox.com/videos/24113479/what-the-red-sea-ship-attacks-are-really-about

After the Israel-Hamas war broke out on October 7, 2023, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, began attacking ships passing through the Red Sea. The Houthis pledged to attack any ship in these waters that does business with Israel, to protest IIsrael'swar in Gaza and to show solidarity with Palestinians there. But as the attacks have continued, another motive for them has become apparent: strengthening the HHouthis'control of Yemen.

After nine years of civil war, the Houthis today control a sizable area in Yemen, with over 70 per cent of the Yemeni population within the group's territory. The conflict has devastated the country, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. More than 377,000 Yemenis have been killed — by airstrikes from a Saudi-led coalition, landmines and detonations planted by the Houthis, a lack of medical services, and scarcity of food and water due to a naval blockade. Both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis have been accused of committing war crimes against Yemenis.

Today, the Houthis are attempting to establish themselves as Yemen's Legitimate leaders in the eyes of Yemenis, though they've done little to improve the country's humanitarian crisis. The Red Sea attacks, which appear to have significant support among the Yemeni people, might be a means to achieve that goal.

 

 

 

Add info No2)

Who are the Houthis, and why are they attacking Red Sea ships?

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911

Houthi rebels have launched more than 40 attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since November.
The Houthis are an Iranian-backed rebel group which considers Israel an enemy.
Why are the Houthis attacking Red Sea ships?

In response to the war in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis started firing drones and missiles towards Israel. Most have been intercepted.
On November 19, the Houthis hijacked a commercial ship in the Red Sea.
They have since launched dozens of missile and drone attacks on commercial ships. Of these, 34 have resulted in reported damage to vessels.
****
Saudi Arabia and the US say Iran has smuggled weapons - including drones and cruise and ballistic missiles - to the Houthis during Yemen's civil war in violation of a UN arms embargo.
It says such missiles and drones have been used in attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as its ally, the United Arab Emirates.
****
Iran denies supplying weapons to the Houthis and says it only supports them politically.
"The Houthis could not operate at this level without Iranian arms, training and intelligence," says Dr Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East specialist at Cambridge University.

 

Add info No3)

The vessel struck in the Red Sea as Houthis promised attacks on more shipping lanes.
The leader of the Iran-aligned group says Houthis will prevent Israel-linked ships from passing through the Indian Ocean.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/15/vessel-struck-in-red-sea-as-houthis-vow-attacks-on-more-shipping-lanes

 

Add info No4)


Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade  
In the first two months of 2024, Suez Canal trade dropped by 50 per cent from a year earlier, while trade through the Panama Canal fell by 32 per cent, disrupting supply chains and distorting key macroeconomic indicators

https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade

 

 

Add info No5)

Were the Saudis Right About the Houthis After All?
For years, Riyadh struggled to convince its Western allies that the Yemeni militia posed a severe threat.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/01/were-saudis-right-about-houthis-after-all/677225/

 


Informed Americans finally seem to understand that the macabre slogan of Yemen's Houthi militia group—"God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam"—is more than empty rhetoric.

The Houthis are a potent Iranian proxy group, and their slogan, adapted from Iranian revolutionary propaganda, is being made manifest in action. They've attacked Red Sea shipping lanes more than 30 times since October 17, under the implausible pretext of aiding Hamas and protesting Israeli military actions in Gaza.

 

Washington has long held, against Saudi protestations, that the Houthis didn't or couldn't possibly pose a significant threat beyond Yemen. Now, the United States is leading a large coalition of countries determined to restore maritime security against Houthi piracy in the Red Sea. Surely those behind Washington's efforts are asking themselves: Were the Saudis right about the Houthis all along?

Saudi Arabia has taken the Houthi threat seriously since 2015, when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman first emerged as an essential Saudi decision-maker. That March, Riyadh organised a coalition of Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, to stop the Houthis from taking over Yemen during that country's civil war. The intervention was consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2216 but met with only cautious approval from Washington. Barack Obama's administration later reluctantly decided to support the action in exchange for Saudi Arabia's help in getting Gulf Arab countries to approve, with even more significant misgivings, Washington's nuclear negotiations with Iran. Many Arab countries and Israel worried that the resulting atomic deal would unduly strengthen Tehran.


Riyadh grasped the genuine fanaticism and growing power of the Houthis in a way that many in Washington did not. The threat the Saudis perceived applied as much to US interests as to Saudi ones—primarily, US interests in the Middle East are understood to no longer be limited to oil, Israel, and counterterrorism. Three of the world's great maritime choke points surround the Arabian Peninsula: the Strait of Hormuz, which controls ingress and egress from the Gulf; the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at one end of the Red Sea; and the Suez Canal, at the other, leading to the Mediterranean. At least 12 per cent of global commerce passes through the Suez Canal. The Houthis have been wreaking havoc in and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, disrupting global supply chains and sending even the price of flavoured coffee beans soaring this January.

The Houthis pretend that they are bolstering Hamas and striking Israel by disrupting international commerce that is connected to neither. But what they may be doing is expressing their enthusiasm for the so-called Axis of resistance and, at the same time, legitimating the power they have grabbed by force in much of northern Yemen. The Houthis could even be seeking to compete with Hezbollah for primacy among the pro-Iranian Arab militias on the Axis.

Iran, whose Quds Force maintains and coordinates this alleged Axis, may also send a message through the Houthis. The first part of that message is that there will be no maritime-security framework in the Gulf or the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula unless Iran and its Arab proxies are included in it; the second is that if Tehran is not at liberty to sell its oil freely—because US or international sanctions, for example—no one else will be able to engage in commerce unmolested, either. The Houthis may be the ones acting under cover of the Gaza crisis and in the entirely unconvincing name of supporting Hamas and lashing out at Israel, but they are making a long-standing point of Iran.


Experience, including with Somali pirates, has shown that attempting to patrol large bodies of water with a limited naval force isn't enough to suppress piracy. Instead, the cost of such aggression has to be rendered unsustainable for the culprits. The Biden administration is now leading the international demand that the Houthis cease and that the security of international shipping and commerce in this all-important waterway be restored. The Houthis, for their part, appear to be relishing the prospect of a confrontation with the United States. That is, or at least must be made to be their problem.

Virtually no one is publicly admitting that, although Saudi Arabia blundered into a quagmire in Yemen that it either should have avoided or been much better supported by the West, Riyadh was essentially right about the nature and danger of the Houthis. And those who claimed that the Saudis were on a madcap, totally avoidable, and inexplicable adventure had no idea what they were talking about.

 

 

Add info No6)

[Q&A] What is the difference between Sunnis and Shiites?

https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3072317

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Shiite power Iran have risen again following the execution of a Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia, a country dominated by Sunni Muslims, on the 2nd. Iran had repeatedly urged the Saudis not to carry out the execution. Below is a Q&A on the differences between Sunnis and Shiites that have divided the two countries.

Q: How did the two factions split up?

A: Disagreements arose among Muslim believers over the choice of a successor to the Prophet Mohammed, who died in 632 AD, which developed into a sectarian split.

While some followers believed that a successor should be chosen from among Muhammad's disciples, others claimed that the successor should be one of Muhammad's relatives and that Muhammad had supported his cousin Ali as his successor. This sect became known as the "Shi'ites of Ali" (Shi'ite means party in Arabic) and later became known as the Shi'ites.

In the end, the first caliph (the successor of the Prophet Muhammad, originally meaning a representative) was Abu Bakr, a confidant of Muhammad. The first three caliphs were chosen from among Muhammad's close associates, but the fourth caliph was his cousin, Ali.